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Abstract
In this paper we present an open source, fully asynchronous, leaderless al-
gorithm for reaching consensus in the presence of Byzantine faults in an
asynchronous network. We prove the algorithm’s correctness provided that
less than a third of participating nodes are faulty. We also present a way
of applying the algorithm to a network with dynamic membership, i.e. a
network in which nodes can join and leave at will. The core contribution
of this paper is an optimal model in the definition of an asynchronous BFT
protocol, and which is resilient to 1/3 byzantine nodes. This model matches
an agreement with probability one (unlike some probabilistic methods), and
where a common coin is used as a source of randomization so that it respects
the FLP impossibility result.
Keywords: asynchronous, byzantine, consensus, distributed
1. Introduction
This paper presents a new Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus algo-
rithm that can work under asynchronous conditions. Like Hashgraph [5] and
Aleph [12], it has no leaders, no round robin, no proof-of-work and reaches
eventual consensus with probability one. It is also fully open, and a work-in-
progress implementation written in Rust is available [13]. Like HoneyBadger
BFT [14], this algorithm is built by composing a number of good ideas present
in the literature. A gossip protocol is used to allow efficient communication
between nodes [11], as in Hashgraph [5], Aleph [12] and Avalanche [17].
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The general problem of reaching Byzantine agreement on any value is
reduced to the simpler problem of reaching binary Byzantine agreement on
the nodes participating in each decision. This allows us to reuse the elegant
binary Byzantine agreement protocol described in [15] after adapting it to
the gossip protocol.
Finally, even though a trusted dealer (or another trusted external source of
private key shares) is still required to initialise the instances of the algorithm
(like in [14]), changes to the set of processes executing the instances (which
we call dynamic membership) can be made without the need for such external
sources. The resulting algorithm is a Protocol for Asynchronous, Reliable,
Secure and Efficient Consensus. PARSEC is a key building block of the
SAFE Network, an ethical decentralized network of data and applications
providing Secure Access For Everyone [16].
The key contribution of this paper is the creation of an asynchronous BFT
protocol, and which is resilient to 1/3 byzantine nodes. This is an optimal
model. It also satisfies an agreement with probability one (unlike some prob-
abilistic methods), and with a common coin for source of randomization that
it respects the FLP impossibility result [8][10]. The algorithm uses gossip for
efficient and resilient communication. It is leaderless (with a caveat at net-
work start-up) and the paper outlines how it can be adapted it to a dynamic
membership context, while remaining leaderless after start-up. In compara-
ble work, HBBFT (Honey Badger of BFT) has a less efficient communication
mechanism with a secure broadcast [14], and HashGraph is not rigorous in a
liveness proof [3] and where the published work only discusses the possibility
of using a common coin in passing [5]. AlephZero [12] is more recent than
our initial work [13] and is an improvement on HashGraph, and which also
includes the use of a common coin. Avalanche [17] differs from our work in
that is uses a synchronous context. None of these methods, though, includes
dynamic membership, and this is a key differentiator in this paper.
2. Related work
A gossip protocol has been likened to office workers spreading a rumour,
and where Alice starts a new rumour, and then passes it to Bob, who then
passes it to Dave. Alice then tells it to Frank, and who might have already
heard it from Dave. In this way the rumour propagates quickly through a
network, depending on the frequency that those spreading the rumours will
pass them on. The advantages of gossip protocols was outlined by [6] and who
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defined that they could be used with autonomic self-management, repair of
inconsistencies, reliable multicast and distributed search. In actual operation,
a gossip protocol involves a group of agents who hold private information,
and who can communicate with each other. The core objective is for all
of the agents to learn the private information [4], and where distributed
epistemic methods lead to simplified system models. A core weakness of
the gossip protocols is that the dissemination of the rumour might not be
radiated across a whole network of connections. Recent applications of gossip
protocols has included the verifying the consistency of certificate logs [9].
Honey Badger is Byzantine Fault Tolerant [14] which is asynchronous in its
scope. It does not involve a leader node beyond the trusted setup phase and
can cope with corrupted nodes. It does not actually make any commitments
around the timing of the delivery of a message, and where even if Eve control
the scheduling of messages, there will be no impact of the overall consensus.
It can reach a consensus within an infrastructure of f failed nodes, and where
the total number of node (N) is greater than 3× f .
Hashgraph builds on the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) approach [5]
with gossip communications; gossip-about-gossip methods; and Byzantine
voting algorithms. The gossip-about-gossip method allows for the history of
all the communications within an infrastructure to be reconstructed. Avalanche
[17] focuses on a scaleable electronic payment system. It uses synchronous
communications with a leaderless BFT. In the face of adversaries, it uses a
probabilistic safety guarantee.
3. The algorithm description
3.1. The network model
We assume the network to be a set N of N instances of the algorithm com-
municating via asynchronous connections, which means that messages sent
over these connections are all delivered eventually, but we make no assump-
tions regarding the delays between sending the message and its reception. In
such a setup, it is impossible to distinguish between an instance failing by
completely stopping and a large delay in message delivery.
We allow a possibility of up to f Byzantine (arbitrary) failures, where
3f < N . We will call the instances that have not failed correct or honest,
and the failing instances faulty or malicious - as the Byzantine failure model
allows for malicious behaviour and collaboration. We will refer to any set of
instances containing more than 2
3
N of them as a supermajority.
3
3.2. Data structures
A node executing the algorithm keeps two data structures: a gossip graph
and an ordered set of blocks. The vertices of the gossip graph, called gossip
events, contain the following fields:
• Payload - data the node wants to pass to other nodes
• Self-parent (optional) - a cryptographic hash of another gossip event
created by the same node
• Other-parent (optional) - a hash of another gossip event created by
some other node
• Cause - cause of creation for this event; can be sync, observation or
coin share
• Creator ID - the public key of the event’s creator
• Signature - a cryptographic signature of the above fields
The self-parent and other-parent are always present, except for the first
events created by respective nodes, as there are no parent events to be referred
to in such cases. Other-parent is also absent in events created because of an
observation or a coin share - because there is no gossip partner in such a
case.
The blocks in the ordered set are network events signed by a subset of the
nodes in the network. This set is the output of the algorithm, and represents
an order of network events that all nodes agree upon. We call the blocks that
are elements of the ordered set stable blocks. Let us also define a few useful
terms regarding the gossip graph for future use.
Definition 3.1. We say that event A is an ancestor of event B iff: A = B,
or A is an ancestor of B’s self-parent, or A is an ancestor of B’s other-parent.
Definition 3.2. We say that event A is a self-ancestor of event B iff: A = B,
or A is a self-ancestor of B’s self-parent.
Definition 3.3. We say that event A is a descendant of event B iff B is an
ancestor of A.
Definition 3.4. We say that event A is a self-descendant of event B iff B is
a self-ancestor of A.
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Following Hashgraph[5], we also define two additional useful notions:
Definition 3.5. An event A is said to see an event B iff B is an ancestor of
A, and there doesn’t exist any pair of events by B’s creator B1, B2, such that
B1 and B2 are ancestors of A, but B1 is neither an ancestor nor a descendant
of B2 (see fig. 1). We call a situation in which such a pair exists a fork.
Definition 3.6. An event A is said to strongly see an event B iff A sees a
set of events created by a supermajority of nodes in the system that all see
B (see fig. 2).
Figure 1: d_4 sees b_0: b_0 is its
ancestor and there are no forks
Figure 2: a_1 strongly sees b_0: it
sees itself, b_1 and d_1, which have
been created by a supermajority of
nodes and all see b_0
3.3. General overview of the algorithm
The nodes execute two main steps in an infinite loop:
• Synchronise the gossip graph with another random node
5
• Determine whether any new blocks should be appended to the ordered
set
3.3.1. Synchronisation
This step is responsible for building the gossip graph and spreading in-
formation around the network. Nodes continually make random calls, called
sync calls, to other nodes and exchange information about the graph, so that
all correct nodes end up with the same data in their graphs. The hashes and
signatures in gossip events make sure that malicious nodes won’t be able to
tamper with any part of the graph.
Whenever a node receives a sync call, it creates a new gossip event. The
self-parent of this event is the hash of the last gossip event created by the
recipient, and the other-parent is the hash of the last event created by the
sender (which the recipient learns about from the call). The new event also
stores the reason for which it was created (cause: sync).
If the recipient of a sync call believes it knows a network event that should
be appended as the next one in the chain, it records its vote as the payload
of the newly created event. The other nodes will learn of this vote during
subsequent sync calls made by its creator.
Lemma 3.1. If A and B are correct nodes, then every event created by A
will eventually have a descendant created by B.
Proof. This trivially follows from the network assumption that every message
is eventually delivered, and from the fact that nodes continue to make sync
calls, which result in the callee creating a descendant of the caller’s last
event.
3.3.2. Determining order
During this step, a node analyses the graph, counts the votes and decides
which block should become the next one. This step is a complex one and so
it is described in detail in a separate subsection below.
3.4. Calculating the order
To be able to order blocks, we need first to have some blocks that can be
ordered.
Every event has a set of interesting payloads associated with it, which are
some of the network events its ancestors contain votes for. The exact way
the set of interesting payloads is calculated is left to the user; however, it has
to satisfy some constraints:
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• If event e has an interesting payload p, there exists an ancestor of e
containing a vote for p.
• If e has an interesting payload p, no self-descendants of e have an
interesting payload p.
• If event a has an interesting payload p, a is an ancestor of event e and
e has no self-ancestor having an interesting payload p, then e has an
interesting payload p.
• If e has an interesting payload p, then no stable block contains p.
For example, p might become an interesting payload of e if e has a single
ancestor that contains a vote for p. Another option is that p only becomes
an interesting payload if there is a supermajority of ancestors of e containing
votes for p. An event that has a non-empty set of interesting payloads is
called an interesting event.
From the first constraint on interesting payloads it follows that an in-
teresting event always has a self-parent. Only the initial events have no
self-parents, but they are their only ancestors, and they never contain votes,
so they can’t be interesting.
The first gossip event created by any given node which strongly sees inter-
esting events created by a supermajority of nodes is said to be an observer.
The interesting events don’t need to have the same interesting payloads -
in fact, it is the case when they have different payloads that is the most
interesting.
Since observers are descendants of interesting events, and interesting events
always have self-parents, it follows that observers always have self-parents as
well. An observer implicitly carries a list of N meta-votes. Every meta-vote
is just a binary value denoting whether a corresponding node’s interesting
event is to be taken into account when determining the order. An observer
casts a meta-vote of true on a node if it can strongly see an interesting event
by that node. Each node casts a meta-vote on every node, hence each node
casts N meta-votes, and since an observer strongly sees a supermajority of
interesting events, by definition, more than 2
3
N of them are true.
Meta-votes reduce the problem of Byzantine agreement about the order
to that of binary Byzantine agreement, which has been solved previously[15].
The algorithm described in [15], like many ABFT algorithms, requires a de-
vice called a common coin. PARSEC is no different in this regard. In PAR-
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SEC, we utilise a common coin based on a threshold cryptography scheme
using Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures [7].
3.4.1. Binary agreement
For the sake of simplicity, we will define the algorithm in terms of deciding
a singlemeta-election - that is, deciding whether or not to take a single node’s
opinion into account when trying to choose a single new block. We can view
a meta-election for node X with latest agreed block B as a function on a
subset HX,B of the gossip graph G, which is the set of all events that are
descendants of any observer of this meta-election:
meta_electionX,B : HX,B → {0, 1,⊥}
The ⊥ value means that the result has not been decided yet at this point
in the graph.
Any gossip event which is an element of HX,B and is not an observer
trivially has a self-parent in HX,B.
From this point on, until section 3.4.3, whenever we mention a meta-
election, we mean a single meta-election regarding a single node, with a
specific block B being the last stable one.
In order to calculate the meta-election value for events in HX,B, we will
need to calculate a few helper values as well:
• stage - a counter denoting the calculation stage
• estimates - a set of one or two values estimating the final result
• bin_values - a helper set of binary values
• aux - a helper binary value
stage is an integer value which represents the stage of the protocol we are
considering when looking at a specific gossip event. A number is associated
with each gossip event, such that the stage of the observers is always 0. The
stage of any other gossip event is either the stage of its self-parent, or the stage
of its self-parent plus one under specific conditions. The exact conditions
under which the stage is incremented will be described later in more details.
Other variables such as estimates, bin_values and aux all depend on the stage.
estimates (abbreviated est) is a set of binary values that represent the
perceived opinion(s) of the creator of any gossip event on the outcome of a
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meta-election. The initial estimates of an observer is the set containing just
its own meta-vote, and it is the set of the self-parent’s estimates for other
events, except the events which increase the stage - it is then calculated from
the results of the previous stage.
If the initial estimates for an event contain a single value v, and that
event sees more than N
3
events with ¬v in their estimates (which means that
at least one honest node estimated ¬v), this opposite value gets added to its
estimates (so it will contain both true and false).
Note: the convention in function definitions below is that the value of the
function is the first value for which the corresponding condition is satisfied.
We also use the common convention of 0 denoting false, and 1 denoting true.
init_est : HX,B → 2{0,1}
init_est(e) =

{v} if e is an observer
with meta-vote v
next_est(self_par(e)) if stage(e) > stage(self_par(e))
est(self_par(e)) otherwise
est : HX,B → 2{0,1}
est(e) =

{v} if there exists an ancestor d of e
such that v = meta_election(d) 6= ⊥
{0, 1} if init_est(e) = {v}
and e sees ≥ N
3
events x
by different nodes such that
stage(x) = stage(e) and ¬v ∈ est(x)
init_est(e) otherwise
self_par(e) denotes e’s self-parent, and next_est and stage will be defined
later, once we have defined more values related to the events.
Once an event can see a supermajority of events by different nodes which
agree in their estimates, this agreed estimate becomes an element of this
event’s bin_values (abbreviated bv). This set serves to validate values pro-
posed by other nodes - if they propose something we don’t have in bin_values,
we will reject it, as we have no way to ensure its validity.
bv : HX,B → 2{0,1}
9
bv(e) = {v : there exist > 2
3
N events x
by different nodes such that
e sees x and stage(e) = stage(x) and v ∈ est(x)
or there exists an ancestor d of e
such that meta_election(d) = v 6= ⊥}
Figure 3: An example gossip graph, along with estimates and bin_values associated with
each gossip event. It illustrates how different nodes process the information they receive
in order to populate their bin_values.
If an event’s parent has an empty aux value, and the event itself has non-
empty bin_values, it can propose a value to be agreed. This proposing is
realised by having a non-empty aux value. If bin_values contains just one
value, this value becomes the aux value; otherwise, we can pick an arbitrary
value, so we will pick true. If the parent’s value isn’t empty, it becomes our
value as well.
aux : HX,B → {0, 1,⊥}
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aux(e) =

v if there exists an ancestor d of e
such that v = meta_election(d) 6= ⊥
⊥ if bv(e) = ∅
w if bv(e) = {w}
and aux(self_par(e)) = ⊥
1 if bv(e) = {0, 1}
and aux(self_par(e)) = ⊥
aux(self_par(e)) if aux(self_par(e)) 6= ⊥
Whenever an event sees a supermajority of events with valid aux values,
we perform the common coin protocol (described in section 3.4.2), which will
lead either to deciding the final agreed value, or updating the estimates and
moving to the next stage.
First, let us define some helper functions:
supermajority_valid_aux : HX,B → {0, 1}
supermajority_valid_aux(e) = e sees a supermajority
of events x by different nodes
such that stage(x) = stage(e)
and aux(x) ∈ bv(e)
count_aux : HX,B × {0, 1} → N
count_aux(e, v) = number of events x by different nodes such that
e sees x and stage(x) = stage(e)
and aux(x) ∈ bv(e) and aux(x) = v
Now we can define how to determine a decided value:
meta_election : HX,B → {0, 1,⊥}
meta_election(e) =

v if there exists an ancestor d of e
such that v = meta_election(d) 6= ⊥
1 if coin_flip(e) = 1
and count_aux(e, 1) > 2
3
N
0 if coin_flip(e) = 0
and count_aux(e, 0) > 2
3
N
⊥ otherwise
coin_flip is the value of the common coin flip and will be defined later, in
section 3.4.2.
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If an event sees a supermajority of valid aux values, but isn’t able to decide,
the next event will mark the beginning of the next stage of the algorithm.
This lets us finally define stage:
stage : HX,B → N
stage(e) =
{
0 if e is an observer
next_stage(self_par(e)) otherwise
next_stage : HX,B → N
next_stage(e) = stage(e) +

1 if supermajority_valid_aux(e)
and next_est(e) 6= ⊥
0 otherwise
If we don’t decide in a stage, we need new estimates for the next one. This
is being taken care of by the common coin protocol briefly mentioned before,
and described in more detail in section 3.4.2.
In every stage, when the coin value is known, we can either decide or
calculate the initial estimate for the next stage. The general rule is this: we
decide v if we see a supermajority of aux values of v and the coin value is
v. If we see a supermajority of aux values of ¬v and the coin value is v, we
estimate ¬v in the next stage. If we don’t see any supermajority, we estimate
the coin value in the next stage.
To calculate new estimates, we will define a next_est function (which
appeared already in the definition of est):
next_est : HX,B → 2{0,1} ∪ {⊥}
next_est(e) =

{v} if count_aux(e, v) > 2
3
N
and coin_flip(e) 6= ⊥
{coin_flip(e)} if count_aux(e, 0) ≤ 2
3
N
and count_aux(e, 1) ≤ 2
3
N
and coin_flip(e) 6= ⊥
⊥ otherwise
We can now start defining the coin_flip function.
3.4.2. Common coin
The common coin protocol is used to calculate the value of the coin flip
in a stage. Every stage can either have a predefined coin value, or demand a
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genuine flip. The exact pattern of which stage has which option associated
with it can be defined by the user, as long as there will be infinitely many
genuine flips with the stage number tending towards infinity (otherwise the
termination property of the algorithm - explained later in the paper - will
not hold).
The simplest pattern would be to require a genuine flip at every stage.
But other patterns [2], e.g. 1, 0, flip, 1, 0, flip[18], etc. can be used to avoid
some of the expensive flips, and optimise more for the optimistic case. Using
fixed values at some stages may speed up reaching consensus in some cases,
as it doesn’t require the exchange of coin shares and returns the coin value
right away.
For the genuine flip, the nodes do need to exchange coin shares. In order to
define what they are, let us first define the round hash as follows. This hash
will help us uniquely identify one particular stage of a specific meta-election
for a given node’s meta vote:
round_hash : HX,B → [0, 2256)
round_hash(e) = hash(hash(X), hash(payload(B)), hash(stage(e)))
All nodes are assumed to possess private key shares - parts of a Boneh-
Lynn-Shacham private key in a threshold scheme, in which at least N
3
sig-
nature shares (signatures generated with private key shares) are needed to
reconstruct a full signature, and any N
3
signature shares will result in the
same, bit-by-bit identical signature. All nodes are also in possession of public
keys corresponding to all other nodes, so that they can verify each signature
share independently, as well as the full signature.
When a node creates an event e with stage(e) corresponding to a genuine
flip, that sees a supermajority of aux values in its stage, it signs round_hash(e)
with its private key share and publishes the resulting signature share in a
gossip event with cause coin share. Once an event sees enough events with
valid coin shares, it can collect them and calculate the full signature, of which
the lowest order bit will be taken as the coin flip value.
Let us define count_shares analogously to count_aux:
count_shares : HX,B × {0, 1} → N
count_shares(e) = number of events x by different nodes such that
e sees x and stage(x) = stage(e)
and x contains a valid coin share for stage(e)
13
The genuine flip can then be defined as:
genuine_flip : HX,B → {0, 1,⊥}
genuine_flip(e) =

lowest order bit
of the full signature if count_shares(e) ≥ N
3⊥ otherwise
Let us denote the set of stages with coin value fixed to 1 as C1, the set of
stages with coin value fixed to 0 as C0, and the set of genuine flip stages as
Cf . The sets satisfy C1 ∪ C0 ∪ Cf = N, C1 ∩ C0 = C1 ∩ Cf = C0 ∩ Cf = ∅,
and |Cf | = |N|. Then, the full coin flip will be defined as follows:
coin_flip : HX,B → {0, 1,⊥}
coin_flip(e) =

1 if stage(e) ∈ C1
0 if stage(e) ∈ C0
genuine_flip(e) if stage(e) ∈ Cf
This is all we need to reach consensus on the meta-votes.
3.4.3. Agreement about the next block
Using the above, every node can calculate the results of all meta-elections.
Once the results are known, they can be used to determine the next block in
the ordered set.
Let us remember that the meta-elections started with a set of observers
- a set of events that all strongly see a supermajority of interesting events.
The results of the meta-elections tell us which interesting events are to be
taken into account.
The properties of meta-elections ensure that all nodes will agree on the
considered set of nodes. What we need to do is change that into an agreement
on what the next block should be. This is pretty trivial, although we must
consider two issues: every node could create multiple interesting events, and
every interesting event could contain multiple interesting payloads.
To counter the first issue, we can just take the earliest interesting event
created by a given node. The events created by a single node form a linear
sequence, so the earliest one is well-defined. This narrows the considered set
down to a single interesting event per node.
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The next step is to choose a valid block among potentially multiple ones
seen by the chosen interesting event. To do that, we can take the lexico-
graphically first one, or use really any method that will always choose the
same element of a set.
Once we have one vote on a block per node, we just count them and the
next agreed block will be the one with the most votes. Any ties can be broken
again by lexicographic ordering, or some other method.
It is also possible to repeat the steps above for other interesting payloads
of the interesting events that have been selected by the meta-election as an
optimisation, so that a single meta-election results in appending multiple
stable blocks.
This completes the description of the algorithm. The next section will
prove that it is correct, that is, that it provides robust consensus in an
asynchronous setting, and in the presence of Byzantine faults.
4. Proof of correctness
Let us begin by stating two important properties of the gossip graph.
Definition 4.1. We call two gossip graphs consistent iff for every gossip
event x that is present in both graphs, both contain the same set of ancestors
of x with the same sets of edges between them.
Lemma 4.1. All nodes in the network have consistent gossip graphs.
Lemma 4.2. If a pair of gossip events (x, y) is a fork, and another gossip
event z strongly sees x, then no other gossip event in a consistent graph can
strongly see y.
We won’t prove the above lemmas - they have been proved in [5] (as
Lemma 5.11 and 5.12, respectively). Note that lemma 4.2 only holds if
N > 3f , but we assume that anyway.
Let us now prove some properties of our approach stemming from it being
an adaptation of [15].
Lemma 4.3 (Interesting events). If a correct node creates an interesting
event with payload p, then all correct nodes will eventually create an inter-
esting event with payload p.
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Proof. Let e be the event created by a correct node that has interesting pay-
load p. By lemma 3.1, eventually every correct node will create a descendant
of e. By the properties of interesting payloads, either this descendant or one
of its self-ancestors will then have interesting payload p. Thus, for every
correct node, there will be an event that is an interesting event with payload
p, which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.4 (Aux values). If all correct nodes created an event in stage s,
then all correct nodes will eventually create an event with an aux value in
stage s.
Proof. Every event in stage s has at least one estimate. There is a super-
majority of correct nodes, so there will exist a value v such that at least
N/3 correct nodes have v in estimates. Thus, there will exist a value v that
will eventually be estimated by all honest nodes, which means it will get
promoted to bin-values by all honest nodes. Once bin_values is not empty
for an event, this event also has an aux value. Since all honest nodes will
eventually create events with non-empty bin-values, these events will have
aux values, which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.5 (Progress). If a correct node created a gossip event in stage s,
every other correct node will eventually create an event in stage s as well.
Proof. Assume s = 0. The first gossip event in stage 0 is an observer. If a
correct node created an observer, it must have strongly seen a supermajority
of interesting events. A supermajority always contains a correct node, so at
least one correct node created an interesting event. By lemma 4.3, all correct
nodes will eventually have created interesting events.
If all correct nodes created interesting events, it means that eventually
all correct nodes will create an event strongly seeing a supermajority of in-
teresting events - as there is a supermajority of correct nodes, they continue
gossipping and they never fork. Thus, all correct nodes will eventually create
observers, which completes the proof for s = 0.
Assume the lemma holds for stage s. We will now prove that this implies
it holds for stage s+ 1.
Assume a correct node created an event in stage s + 1. This means that
this event sees a supermajority of events in stage s with some aux values.
This means that at least one honest node created an event in stage s, so
by our assumption, all honest nodes will have eventually created an event
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in stage s. By lemma 4.4, this means that all honest nodes will eventually
have created an event in stage s with an aux value. All honest nodes will
eventually create events that see all these events with aux values, which
constitutes a supermajority, which is enough to progress to the next stage
- so all honest nodes will create an event in stage s + 1. By induction, the
proof is complete.
Lemma 4.6. If all correct nodes created events in stage s and stage s is a
genuine flip stage, then the estimates of the nodes’ events in the next stage
will be in agreement with probability ≥ 1
2
.
Proof. Let us consider the worst case scenario, in which there are f malicious
nodes among the N = 3f + 1 nodes. Let us also assume that the adversary
controls the timing of the messages, so by controlling which messages are
delivered when, they can control the gossip pattern and effectively, to some
extent, the values associated with the gossip events.
Assume the adversary tries to force a disagreement among the honest
nodes. The only way to do so is to make some honest nodes see no agreeing
supermajority among the aux values, which will make them take the coin
value as the next estimate, and other honest nodes to see a supermajority of
aux values opposite to the coin value. In other cases the honest nodes will
automatically have agreeing estimates in stage s+ 1.
The adversary cannot control the coin value, so they need to learn its
value first. It is only possible if at least one honest node published its coin
share, which means it has already seen a supermajority of aux values. Then,
for the first 2f + 1 aux values seen by the correct node, exactly one of the
following is true:
• There are at least f + 1 true aux values.
• There are at least f + 1 false aux values.
Whichever one is true, no matter what control the adversary has over the
remaining aux values, it cannot make other honest nodes see a supermajority
for the opposite value. Thus, it is out of the adversary’s control to make the
nodes disagree, as they couldn’t have known beforehand which value they
need to have a supermajority of.
If there is no supermajority of agreeing aux values, the honest nodes will
automatically be in agreement. If there is one and all of them see it, they
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will also be in agreement. If not all of them see it, there is a 1
2
probability
that the coin value will agree, thus also making all honest nodes agree.
Thus, the probability of the honest nodes agreeing in stage s+1 is at least
1
2
.
Lemma 4.7. If all correct nodes’ first events in stage s had estimates = {v},
either they will decide v in stage s, or their first events in stage s + 1 will
also have estimates = {v}.
Proof. If all correct nodes only estimate v, there is no way for any event to
see even N
3
of estimates for ¬v - so no event by a correct node will have it in
its estimates in stage s.
For a value to be an element of bin_values, there must be a supermajority
of events estimating that value. Because of the above, the only value that
can have a supermajority is v. Thus, every event with nonempty bin_values
will have it equal to {v}. Hence, every event with an aux value will have it
equal to v.
In order to proceed to the next stage, an event has to see a supermajority
of valid aux values. No event can have a value other than v as aux in stage
s, so there will always be a supermajority for v. Depending on the coin flip
value, this can either lead to deciding v, or estimating v in stage s+1. Either
way, the agreement will still hold.
Lemma 4.8. If all correct nodes’ first events in stage s had estimates = {v},
they will all decide v eventually.
Proof. No matter what malicious nodes do, there is less than a third of
them, so no event by a correct node will have ¬v in estimates (by definition
of the est function). This means that for bin_values of an event to be non-
empty, it must see a supermajority of estimates for v, as there will never be
a supermajority for ¬v.
The above means that no correct node will add ¬v to bin_values, so all of
them will eventually create an event with aux = v. This means there will be
a supermajority of events by different creators with aux = v, which will make
the correct nodes either decide in stage s (if coin_flip = v), or estimate v for
the next stage. This will repeat until coin_flip = v and the nodes decide v.
Since there will be infinitely many genuine flips with the number of stages
tending to infinity, and each genuine flip will result in v with probability 1
2
,
this will eventually happen with probability 1.
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Theorem 4.9 (Binary Byzantine Consensus). The algorithm for calculating
meta-election results presented in this paper satisfies the general properties
of a Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm:
• Validity - if a correct node decides on a value, it has been proposed by
a correct node.
• Agreement - if a correct node decides on a value, all correct nodes
decide on that value.
• Integrity - once a correct node decides on a value, it never decides on
another value.
• Termination - all correct nodes eventually decide with probability 1.
Validity. We will prove an equivalent statement: that if initially all correct
nodes propose v, then all correct nodes will decide v. Since v is a binary
value, a node can only decide a value not proposed by a correct node if all
correct nodes propose v, and the node decides ¬v. Thus, deciding v when all
correct nodes propose v is equivalent to always deciding on a value proposed
by a correct node.
If all correct nodes propose v, they will all put v in their estimates. By
Lemma 4.8, they will all decide v eventually.
Agreement. Assume there is an event e created by a correct node which was
able to decide a value v. It means that coin_flip(e) = v and this event must
have seen a supermajority of events with aux = v. This means there was no
supermajority for ¬v. Thus, if a correct node has seen a supermajority in
this stage, it must have been for v, so it would decide v. If it hasn’t, it would
estimate v for the next stage, which means there will be agreement at the
start of the next stage. Following Lemma 4.7, this agreement will propagate
to the end of the stage and the next stages, until everyone decides v.
Integrity. Once an event e created by a correct node decides on a value v, all
later events created by that node will have event e as an ancestor. Following
the definition of meta_election, all later events will also decide v.
Termination. By Lemma 4.5, if a correct node creates an event in stage s,
then every correct node eventually creates an event in stage s. This means
there will be events by > 2
3
N correct nodes, which will eventually be seen
by every correct node. Every such event will have non-empty estimates. It
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is not possible for both 0 and 1 to be estimated by < N
3
events by different
correct nodes, so at least one of those values will eventually be an element
of estimates of every correct node’s event.
Eventually, the events with agreeing estimates will all be seen by an event
created by every correct node. Hence, every correct node will eventually
create an event with non-empty bin_values, and so an aux value.
The events with aux values will eventually be seen by every correct node’s
event, which means every correct node will eventually either decide or progress
to the next stage.
By Lemma 4.6, after every stage with a genuine coin flip, all nodes’ es-
timates agree with probability > 1
2
. This means that the probability of
estimates still not agreeing at stage s is less than:
(1− 1
2
)gf(s) =
1
2gf(s)
where gf(s) is the number of genuine flips up to stage s. Since we assume
an infinite number of genuine flip stages as s tends to infinity, gf(s) grows
to infinity as s grows, which implies that the probability of estimates not
agreeing tends to 0. This means that the estimates will eventually agree
with probability 1. By Lemma 4.8, the nodes will decide eventually after
that happens.
The above theorem proves that our algorithm will reach agreement about
every single meta-election in a Byzantine fault tolerant way. This is not the
end, though - we also need to prove that meta-elections lead to agreement
about the next block in the ordered set. The proof of that is presented below.
Lemma 4.10. If the result of a meta-election is v, there have been at least
N
3
meta-votes for v.
Proof. Assume there have been less than N
3
meta-votes for v and v has been
decided. When nodes that initially meta-voted v create an event that sees
a supermajority of meta-votes, this supermajority must contain at least N
3
votes for ¬v - so their estimates will contain ¬v. On the other hand, no
node that meta-voted ¬v can ever create an event that will see at least N
3
estimates for v, so they won’t add v to estimates.
Due to the above, any supermajority among the estimates must be for
¬v. Any event with non-empty bin_values can thus only have ¬v in this set,
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which means that all valid aux values will also be ¬v, which will lead to a
decision on ¬v eventually.
This is a contradiction. Such a situation is impossible, which proves the
lemma.
Lemma 4.11. The set of nodes for which the result of meta-election is true
is always non-empty.
Proof. Assume all meta-elections resulted in false. By Lemma 4.10, at least
N
3
nodes meta-voted false for every node, so there have been at least N2
3
meta-votes for false.
On the other hand, by definition of an observer, every node voted true for
more than 2
3
N nodes - so there have been more than 2
3
N2 meta-votes for true,
which leaves less than N2
3
meta-votes for false (there are N2 meta-votes in
total: N nodes meta-vote in N meta-elections).
This is a contradiction, which proves the lemma.
Theorem 4.12 (Byzantine Consensus). The algorithm for calculating the
next block presented in this paper satisfies the general properties of a Byzan-
tine fault tolerant consensus algorithm:
• Validity - if a correct node decides on a next block, its payload was in
at least one interesting event created by a correct node.
• Agreement - if a correct node decides on a next block, all correct nodes
decide on that block.
• Integrity - once a correct node decides on a next block, it never decides
on another block.
• Termination - all correct nodes eventually decide with probability 1.
Validity. Assume that no correct node created an interesting event with pay-
load p, but p was still decided as the payload of the next block.
This means that only faulty nodes could create interesting events with
payload p, so there is less than N/3 such interesting events. Furthermore, if
a correct node created a descendant of such an interesting event, then either
it or one of its self-ancestors would have to be an interesting event with
payload p as well. This would contradict our assumption, so no correct node
could have created a descendant of an interesting event with payload p.
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It follows from this that when correct nodes create observers, no such
observer can meta-vote true for a creator of an interesting event with payload
p (as it would require the observer to be a descendant of such an event). This
means that after the meta-election is complete, no interesting event with
payload p will be taken into consideration, so p will not be decided as the
payload of the next stable block.
QED by contradiction.
Agreement. Assume that a correct node decided the next block B. Since
a decision has been reached, this means that there is consensus about the
meta-votes, so every correct node will have chosen the same nodes’ interesting
events.
For any observer to meta-vote true on a node, it must have strongly seen
an interesting event by that node. By Lemma 4.2, even if that node created
a fork, if any other observers also voted true on that node, they must have
strongly seen interesting events on the same fork. Thus, we can consider
interesting events by all elected nodes to form linear histories - which will be
seen the same way by all nodes by Lemma 4.1.
In a linear history, the earliest interesting event is well-defined. Also, be-
cause all correct nodes see the same history, they will all choose the same
interesting event as the earliest. If the interesting events has multiple pay-
loads, all correct nodes will use the same tie-breaker algorithm and choose
the same single one. Thus, all correct nodes will gather the same set of votes,
and because they use the same voting rules, decide the same block as the
next one.
Integrity. By construction of the algorithm, once the next block has been
decided, it is appended to the ordered set and no other block can be decided
in its place.
Termination. The consensus algorithm starts when a correct node creates an
interesting event. Once that happens, by lemma 4.3, all correct nodes will
eventually create interesting events, and this in turn implies that all of them
will create observers. Once there is a supermajority of observers, we start
the binary agreement algorithm, which will terminate by Theorem 4.9. After
binary agreement terminates, because the set of voters for the next block is
non-empty (by Lemma 4.11), the next block is already determined - so the
agreement about the next block also terminates.
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5. Conclusions
A new consensus algorithm has been presented, building upon some pre-
vious achievements in this field ([5], [15]), but combining their features in a
novel way. It works under asynchronous conditions, uses a gossip graph (like
[12], [5] and [17]), and a common coin. It is also leaderless (barring the very
initialisation of the network, when a trusted dealer may be required) and an
open source implementation is provided. We believe this approach will be
useful in numerous applications, one of which is the SAFE Network.
Appendix A: Extending the algorithm to a network with dynamic
membership
The main algorithm is formulated in terms of a network in which all the
members are known a priori (a static network). This is enough in some
settings, but sometimes it is necessary to allow the set of members to be
modified, so that members of the network can join and leave at will.
In order to accommodate dynamic membership in the network, every node
has to keep a record of who the current members are. We will call this record
the network members list. This list is initialised with the so called genesis
group and can only be modified as a result of a block becoming stable.
Changing the membership list requires re-generating the common coin
secret key shares, too. We need to generate them in a way that doesn’t
allow any single node to get to know more than just their share. Fortunately,
there are distributed key generation (DKG) algorithms in existence that solve
this problem. One of the simplest ones is [1], but it requires synchronous
communications.
Fortunately, we can simulate synchronous communications using the in-
stances of PARSEC held by the old set of members. DKG messages can be
input as votes into the graph, and the consensus algorithm will ensure that
all nodes will process them in the same order. The messages in the order
that was agreed upon can also be passed to the nodes that are joining, thus
allowing them to generate their key shares.
In summary, a membership change would be processed as follows:
1. The old set of members votes for a membership change (adding or
removing a node).
2. A block with node addition/removal becomes stable.
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3. Nodes from the old members set start the DKG algorithm and begin
voting for DKG messages.
4. Blocks with DKG messages become stable. At some point, enough of
them are stable to complete the DKG algorithm.
5. Nodes from the old set calculate their new key shares and update their
members lists.
6. If a new node was joining, it will start receiving gossip containing the
gossip events since genesis up to this point. By processing the graph,
it can learn of all the blocks that became stable, including the DKG
messages, from which it will be able to derive its own key share. It will
also arrive at the current members list.
7. The membership change is complete.
This method ensures that every meta-election uses a constant list of mem-
bers from start to finish - the members list only gets modified once a meta-
election finishes (the one regarding the block that completed the DKG), and
another one is not yet started. Thanks to this approach, the proofs of cor-
rectness apply without modifications.
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